Abstract. The notion of indifferentiability, introduced by Maurer et al., is an important criterion for the security of hash functions. Concretely, it ensures that a hash function has no structural design flaws and thus guarantees security against generic attacks up to the proven bounds. In this work we prove the indifferentiability of Grøstl, a second round SHA-3 hash function candidate. Grøstl combines characteristics of the wide-pipe and chop-Merkle-Damgård iterations and uses two distinct permutations P and Q internally. Under the assumption that P and Q are random l-bit permutations, where l is the iterated state size of Grøstl, we prove that the advantage of a distinguisher to differentiate Grøstl from a random oracle is upper bounded by O((Kq) 4 /2 l ), where the distinguisher makes at most q queries of length at most K blocks. This result implies that Grøstl behaves like a random oracle up to q = O(2 n/2 ) queries, where n is the output size. Furthermore, we show that the output transformation of Grøstl, as well as 'Grøstail' (the composition of the final compression function and the output transformation), are clearly differentiable from a random oracle. This rules out indifferentiability proofs which rely on the idealness of the final state transformation.
Introduction
Hash functions are a basic building block in cryptography. Formally, a hash function maps a bit string of arbitrary length to an output string of fixed length, H : Z * 2 → Z l 2 . An established practice in the design of hash functions is to first construct a fixed input length compression function, e.g. f :
, and then iterate it to allow the processing of arbitrarily long strings. The most popular iteration principle is the strengthened Merkle-Damgård [12, 18] design 1 . Common hash functions, such as members of the SHA and MD family, incorporate the Merkle-Damgård method in their design. However, recent attacks on the widely used SHA-1 and MD5 [22, 23] have rendered these designs insecure. This grim situation has triggered the launch of the SHA-3 competition [20] for the selection of a new secure hash function algorithm by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). In the current second round of the competition, 14 candidates are under active evaluation. These 14 candidates use a wide variety of iterative modes. Some of the designs still follow the basic Merkle-Damgård iteration. Others either add new features to it, or simply propose different constructions. Candidates from the latter two classes include iterations based on the chop-Merkle-Damgård [13] , HAIFA [7] , wide-pipe [16] and Sponge [5] design strategies. The main advantage of the basic Merkle-Damgård construction is its collision security guarantee under the assumption that the underlying compression function is collision resistant [12, 18] . Other important hash function security properties, such as second preimage and preimage security are, however, not preserved by the Merkle-Damgård iteration [1] . Moreover, the extension attack shows that the Merkle-Damgård hash function is clearly differentiable from a monolithic random oracle [11] . A natural question that arises with the emerge of new iterative designs is to identify the security properties achieved by these constructions. Other than the classical collision, second preimage and preimage security properties, the indifferentiability property has gained more recent attention due to the advancements in the theoretical differentiability model of Maurer et al. [17] and their further development in the context of hashing [11, 2, 9, 10] . Indifferentiability is an important security criterion because it ensures that the hash function has no structural design flaws in composition. Such a result provides a guarantee that no generic attacks (attacks on the iteration which assume ideal behavior of the underlying primitives) up to the proven bounds are possible. In this work we analyze the indifferentiability of the Grøstl SHA-3 candidate [15] . Grøstl borrows characteristics mainly from the wide-pipe and the chopMerkle-Damgård iterations: the iterated state is wider than the final hash output, which classifies it as a type of a wide-pipe design. The iterative message processing together with a final state truncation in Grøstl resemble the chop-MerkleDamgård hash function with the added difference of an output transformation before truncation. More concretely, Grøstl processes its inputs by first calling the compression function f iteratively, then applying a final output transformation to the state and finally truncating the result to the desired output length. The compression function f is built out of two permutations P and Q and the output transformation is designed on top of the permutation P .
Our Result
Indifferentiability results on hash functions can be obtained following several different approaches. One way to argue indifferentiability is to assume ideal behavior of the first layer components (i.e., the underlying compression functions), and prove the result for the concrete composition of interest [11, 10] . Dodis et al. [14] relax the assumption on the internal compression functions from a random oracle to preimage awareness. If a composition is preimage aware, which they show is true for the Merkle-Damgård iteration when the compression function is preimage aware itself, then they prove indifferentiability by assuming idealness only of the final extra transformation. Both approaches turn out futile for the Grøstl hash function: fixed points for the compression function can
Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, where N is the set of natural numbers, let Z n 2 denote the set of bit strings of length n, (Z n 2 )
* the set of strings of length a multiple of n and Z * 2 the set of strings of arbitrary length. If x, y are strings, then x y is the concatenation of x and y. If k, l ∈ N then k l is the encoding of k as an l-bit string. If S is a set, then x $ ← S denotes the uniformly random selection of an element from S. We let y ← A(x) and y $ ← A(x) be the assignment to y of the output of a deterministic and randomized algorithm A, respectively, when run on input x. For a function f , by dom(f ) and rng(f ) we denote the domain and range of f , respectively. Abusing notation, by (x, y) ∈ f , we denote that x ∈ dom(f ) and y = f (x). A random oracle [3] is a function which provides a random output for each new query. A random l-bit permutation is a function that is taken uniformly at random from the set of all l-bit permutations. A random primitive will also be called 'ideal'.
Grøstl
On input of a message of arbitrary length, the Grøstl hash function Gr :
outputs a digest of n bits, with n ∈ {224, 256, 384, 512} [15] . Grøstl is a type of a wide-pipe design where the iterated state size l is significantly larger than the final hash output. More concretely: for n = 224, 256, l = 512, and for n = 384, 512, l = 1024. The Grøstl hash function makes use of the Merkle-Damgård construction to process its inputs, then applies an output transformation on the state value and finally truncates (chops) the result from l to n bits. The Grøstl compression function f :
are two l-bit permutations. Throughout, P and Q are considered to be independent random permutations. For a fixed initialization vector IV n the hash function Gr (see Fig. 1 ) processes an arbitrary length message M as follows:
where chop l−n (x) chops off the l − n rightmost bits of x, and the padding function pad is defined as pad(M ) = M , with M = M 1 0 −|M |−65 mod l (|M | + 65)/l 64 , parsed as a sequence of l-bit blocks. On input of a message M ∈ Z l 2 * , the function depad(M ) is defined as follows: if M = pad(M ) for some message M , it outputs this M , otherwise it outputs ⊥. Observe that the output is unique as the padding function is injective 2 . For an M ∈ Z l 2 * , we denote by Z(M ) the set of all values m ∈ Z l 2 that make (M, m) a valid padding. Formally:
Apart from the indifferentiability of the Grøstl hash function, we also consider the Grøstail function F :
, a composition of the last compression function f with the final transformation (i.e., Grøstail is the 'tail' of Grøstl):
(1)
Indifferentiability
The indifferentiability framework introduced by Maurer et al. [17] is an extension of the classical notion of indistinguishability. It proves that if a construction C G based on an ideal subcomponent G is indifferentiable from an ideal primitive R, then C G can replace R in any system.
Definition 1.
A Turing machine C with oracle access to an ideal primitive G is said to be (t D , t S , q, ε) indifferentiable from an ideal primitive R if there exists a simulator S, such that for any distinguisher D it holds that:
The simulator has oracle access to R and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher runs in time at most t D and makes at mostueries.
In the remainder, we refer to C G , G as the 'real world', and to R, S R as the 'simulated world'; the distinguisher D converses either with the real or the simulated world and its goal is to tell both worlds apart. D can query both its 'left oracle' L (either C or R) and its 'right oracle' R (either G or S). In the remainder, R has four interfaces, corresponding to forward and inverse queries to permutations P and Q. These interfaces are denoted by R P , R P −1 , R Q , R Q −1 .
Differentiability of Grøstail
A recent result by Dodis et al. [14] prescribes how to prove indifferentiability of hash functions by ways of preimage awareness. Loosely speaking, Dodis et al. proved that if H : Z * 2 → Z l 2 is a preimage aware hash function and
2 is a random function, then the composition RO • H is indifferentiable from a random oracle. One might be tempted to consider this approach for the indifferentiability analysis of Grøstl, i.e., by assuming that the output transformation is a random oracle and then proving the Grøstl hash function (without the output transformation) to be preimage aware. However, the behavior of the output transformation P (x) ⊕ x deviates significantly from a random function: similarly to the Davies-Meyer construction [19] , fixed points P (x) ⊕ x = x are easy to compute by making the inverse query P −1 (0) = x. A second attempt is to go one step backwards in the iteration and view the last compression function together with the output transformation, i.e., Grøstail (1), as a random function. We show that this approach also fails since Grøstail is easily differentiable from a random function. Proposition 1. Let P, Q be two random l-bit permutations, let F be the Grøstail compression function (1), and let RO :
2 be a random function. For any simulator S that makes at mostueries to RO, there exists a distinguisher D that makes at most 3 queries to its oracle, such that Adv
Proof. Let S be any simulator that makes at mostueries to RO. We construct a distinguisher D that with overwhelming probability distinguishes Grøstail from a random function in 3 oracle queries. The distinguisher proceeds as follows. First, it makes inverse queries x 2 = R Q −1 (0) and
. Then, it makes a query to the left oracle to obtain y = L(
, this equation holds only if the simulator can find
, only if the simulator can find a fixed point for RO. As the probability for the simulator to find fixed points for RO is upper bounded by q/2 l , the advantage for D to distinguish, Adv
If the final truncation is included in Grøstail as well, a lower bound 1 − q/2 n can be obtained similarly.
Indifferentiability of Grøstl
In this section, we present the main result of this paper: we show that the Grøstl hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, under the assumption that the underlying permutations P, Q are ideal. Intuitively, we demonstrate that there exists a simulator such that no distinguisher can differentiate the real world Gr P,Q , (P, Q) from the simulated world RO, S RO , except with negligible probability. Theorem 1. Let P, Q be two random l-bit permutations, let Gr be the Grøstl hash function (Sect. 2.1), and let RO be a random oracle. Let D be a distinguisher that makes at most q L left queries of maximal length (K − 1)l bits, where K ≥ 1, q P right queries to P and q Q right queries to Q, and runs in time t. Then:
where S makes q S ≤ q P queries to RO and runs in time O(max{q P , q Q } 4 ).
The simulator S used in the proof mimics the behavior of random permutations P and Q such that queries to S and queries to RO are 'consistent', which means that relations among the query outputs in the real world hold in the simulated world as well. To this end, the construction of the simulator is based on several designing decisions. In what remains, the simulator used in the proof (Fig. 2 ) is introduced and explained in more detail. Then, Thm. 1 is proven in Sect. 4.3.
Initialization of the Simulator
The simulator maintains two, initially empty, lists L P , L Q that represent the permutations it simulates. These lists consist of tuples (
, where y denotes the (simulated) image of x under P or Q. Abusing notation, we denote by dom(L P ) (resp. rng(L P )) the set of first (resp. second) elements in L P , and similar for L Q . The simulator has four interfaces, denoted by S P , S P −1 , S Q , S Q −1 , and access to RO. Furthermore, the simulator maintains a graph (V, E), initially ({IV }, ∅). The edges e ∈ E are labeled by messages in Z l 2 : any (
Intuitively, an edge in (V, E) corresponds to an evaluation of the Grøstl compression function f , and if there is a path IV
there is a path from s to t in (V, E) with the edges labeled by
We say that (V, E) contains colliding paths if there exists an s ∈ V such that
Furthermore, by V out , V in we denote the set of vertices in V with an outgoing or ingoing edge, respectively. Observe that if L P , L Q are of size q P , q Q , respectively, the sets V out , V in are of size at most q P q Q . By r(V ), we denote the set of all
By construction, r(V ) ⊆ V in . Finally, we introduce a specific subset of r(V ):
For simplicity, V, r(V ) andr(V ) are updated by the simulator implicitly.
Intuition Behind the Simulator
In this section we take a closer look at the simulator of Fig. 2 by starting with an example. Consider the case that a node x is a member of bothr(V ) and dom(L P ). This means that (1) there exists an M such that IV M −→ x and depad(M ) = ⊥, and (2) there exists a y ∈ rng(L P ), such that y = S P (x). In the real world (where the left oracle is the Grøstl hash function), these values satisfy Gr(depad(M )) = chop l−n (x ⊕ y) by construction. If the simulator does not answer its queries wisely, this equality would hold with negligible probability in the simulated world. More generally, the simulator can guarantee that this equation holds only if x is added to dom(L P ) after it was added tor(V ) (reflected in requirement R3 below) 3 . Maintaining consistency, however, becomes harder when |r(V )| and |dom(L P )| increase. The idea behind the simulator is to answer its queries such that it can control the growth of r(V ), and in particular the growth ofr(V ) as a subset of r(V ), while still maintaining consistency in its answers. Intuitively, the simulator responds to its queries, such that the following requirements are satisfied:
R1. There are no colliding paths in (r(V ), E). Observe that two different paths to the same node may lead to distinguishability for D as the simulator can be consistent with only one of the paths. This requirement is satisfied if r(V ) is never increased with a node that has two incoming edges in the updated 4 graph; R2. S increases r(V ) only if it is forced to do. In particular, r(V ) is never increased with a node that has an outgoing edge in the updated graph. Observe that each path in (r(V ), E) leads to a potential node inr(V ); R3. S never increasesr(V ) with a node in the updated dom(L P ); R4. S increases dom(L P ) with a node inr(V ) only if it is forced to. Observe that in case of inverse queries to S P −1 , the simulator can avoid outputting elements inr(V ). In forward queries to S P , the simulator may be forced to increaser(V ) ∩ dom(L P ). In this case, it consults its oracle RO to generate the answer.
The first two conditions are regarding the growth of r(V ), and the second two concern the growth ofr(V ) ∩ dom(L P ). We show how these conditions occur in the description of the simulator in Fig. 2 . We first consider requirements R1 and R2, then we look at R3 and R4.
Restricting the growth of r(V ) Inverse queries. Consider an inverse query y 1 to S P −1 . It is easy to see that both R1 and R2 are satisfied if the simulator outputs its answer x 1 , such that none of the newly added vertices {x 1 ⊕ x 2 | x 2 ∈ dom(L Q )} to V out is already rooted. A similar observation holds for queries to S Q −1 . These requirements translate to lines 3e and 4c in the description of the simulator in Fig. 2 .
Forward queries. In forward queries to S P , S Q , the simulator may be forced to increase r(V ). Consider a query x 1 to S P , and consider any
to (V, E) by construction. Denote by V the multiset of updated nodes after the query. Then, we require that x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 does not occur twice in V in (in order to establish R1), and moreover that it does not occur in V out (in order to establish R2). If we define V new = {x 1 ⊕ x 2 , x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 | (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ L Q } to be the multiset of newly added nodes to V in the query to S P , both requirements are satisfied if
A similar condition can be derived for queries to S Q . These requirements translate to lines 1k and 2e in the description of the simulator in Fig. 2 .
Restricting the growth ofr(V ) ∩ dom(L P ) Inverse queries. As explained, S never increasesr(V ) ⊆ r(V ) in inverse queries. Hence, requirement R3 is naturally satisfied. Furthermore, R4 is guaranteed if queries to S P −1 are never answered with a node inr(V ). This requirement translates to line 3c from Fig. 2 .
Forward queries. First consider requirement R3. Let the distinguisher make a query to S P or S Q , such thatr(V ) gets increased. By construction and the fact that requirement R2 is satisfied, this means that an edge
, and x 2 ∈ Z(M ). The simulator needs to be designed such that the newly added value tor(V ), x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 , is not a member of (the updated) dom(L P ). This requirement translates to lines 1l and 2f in Fig. 2 . Requirement R4 is clearly not applicable to queries to S Q . Consider a query x 1 to S P , where x 1 ∈r(V ). Then, the simulator is forced to increaser(V ) ∩ dom(L P ).
As x 1 ∈r(V ), there exists an M such that IV M −→ x 1 and depad(M ) = ⊥. The output of the simulator needs to be consistent with its random oracle, such that RO(depad(M )) = chop l−n (S P (x 1 ) ⊕ x 1 ). This requirement translates to lines 1b-1e in the description of the simulator in Fig. 2. 
Proof of Thm. 1
Thm. 1 will be proven via a game-playing argument, where the games are used to simulate one of the worlds (left or right). It is inspired by the proofs of [11] , but differs in several aspects. Let S be the simulator of Fig. 2 , and let D be any distinguisher that makes at most q L left queries of maximal length (K − 1)l bits, where K ≥ 1, q P right queries to P and q Q right queries to Q. Recall from Def. 1 that the goal is to bound:
Game 1 (Fig. 3) . The left oracle L 1 of game 1 is a lazily-sampled random oracle, and the four interfaces of the right oracle are the simulator of On query S P (x 1 ):
On query S Q (x 2 ):
On query S P -1 (y 1 ):
On query S Q -1 (y 2 ):
Fig. 2. The simulator S for P and Q used in the proof of Thm. 1.
Game 2 (Fig. 3) . Game 2 only differs from game 1 in the left oracle: L 1 is replaced by a relay oracle L 2 that simply passes the queries made by the distinguisher to L 1 . The right oracle remains unchanged, and still queries the subroutine L 1 . The distinguisher has identical views in G 1 and G 2 . Formally, we obtain Pr D G1 = 1 = Pr D G2 = 1 . Game 3 (Fig. 4) . Game 3 differs from game 2 in the fact that the left oracle L 2 is replaced by the Grøstl hash function, which makes queries to the right oracle. The right oracle itself remains unchanged, and still queries subroutine L 1 . It is proven in Prop. 2 that, until bad := 4 i=0 bad i occurs in any of the two games, both are identical. Formally, we obtain:
Game 4 (Fig. 5) . Game 4 differs from game 3 in the fact that the right oracle does not query subroutine L 1 anymore, but rather, it generates the outcomes itself. Concretely, in line 1c, h is now randomly sampled from Z n 2 . The distinguisher cannot notice the difference: as the padding rule is injective, in game 3 the right oracle R P will never query its left oracle twice on the same value, and hence it will always receive h $ ← Z n 2 . Formally, we obtain Pr D G3 = 1 = Pr D G4 = 1 . Game 5 (Fig. 5) . Game 5 only differs from game 4 in the fact that the GOTOstatements are removed. In other words, game 5 and game 4 proceed identically until bad occurs. As a consequence:
Game 6 (Fig. 6) . The left oracle of game 6 is the Grøstl algorithm, and the four interfaces of the right oracle perfectly mimic two lazily-sampled random permutations P and Q. In other words, we have G 6 = (Gr P,Q , (P, Q)), and thus Pr D G6 = 1 = Pr D Gr P,Q ,(P,Q) = 1 . The only difference between games 6 and 5 is in the forward queries to R P : in game 5, some queries to R P are answered with uniform random samples from Z l 2 . Therefore, distinguishing game 6 from game 5 is at least as hard as distinguishing a random permutation from a random function. As R P will be queried at most q P + (K + 1)q L =: r P times, we obtain:
As we have Pr D G2 sets bad ≤ Pr D G3 sets bad = Pr D G4 sets bad , we conclude that (3) reduces to:
Game 7 (Fig. 7) . Game 7 is used to simplify the computation of the probability that D G4 sets bad. In game 7, the failure conditions for bad 0 , . . . , bad 4 of game 4 are rewritten into sets A 0 , . . . , A 4 . By the straightforward definition of A 0 , A 3 and A 4 , it is clear that for i = 0, 3, 4, D G4 sets bad i if and only if D G7 sets bad i . Now, suppose D G4 sets bad 1 . This means that for some (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ L Q such that x 1 ⊕ x 2 ∈ r(V ) either one of the following two cases occurred:
By definition of A 1 , this means that y 1 ∈ A 1 . In other words, D G7 sets bad 1 if D G4 sets bad 1 . A similar observation holds for bad 2 . As a consequence, Pr D G4 sets bad ≤ Pr D G7 sets bad , and therefore (4) reduces to:
In the remainder, we concentrate on the computation of these probabilities.
Observe that the distinguisher makes at most q P + (K + 1)q L =: r P queries to R P , R P −1 and q Q + Kq L =: r Q queries to R Q , R Q −1 .
Pr D G7 sets bad 0 . Consider the j th query to R P , 1 ≤ j ≤ r P . The probability that bad 0 is set in this query, bad j 0 , equals the probability that y 1 hits A 0 . But as y 1 is taken uniformly at random from a set of size 2 l , and A 0 is of size at most r P , bad j 0 occurs with probability at most r P 2 l . By the union bound, Pr D G7 sets bad 0 ≤ r 2 P 2 l ; Pr D G7 sets bad 1 | D G7 sets ¬bad 0 . Consider the j th query to R P , 1 ≤ j ≤ r P . The probability that bad 1 is set in this query, bad j 1 , equals the probability that y 1 hits A 1 . But as y 1 is taken uniformly at random from a set of size at least 2 l − r P (because D G7 sets ¬bad 0 ), and A 1 is of size at most r Q (2r P r Q + r P ), bad j 1 occurs with probability at most
Analogously, bad 2 is set with probability at most
, bad 3 with probability at most
, and bad 4 with probability at most
under the assumption that r P , r Q < 2 l−1 , we obtain:
This completes the proof of Thm. 1.
Proposition 2.
Until bad occurs in game 2 or 3, both games are identical. Formally:
Proof. We need to prove that the query outcomes in game 2 and 3 are identically distributed, until the distinguisher sets bad in either one of the games. As the right oracles of the games are the same, D can differentiate game 2 and 3 only if it discovers any inconsistencies in the answers by the left oracles (L 2 for game 2 and L 3 for game 3), given any list of queries made by D to the right oracle. Recall that L P , L Q denote the query history to the right oracles R P , R Q , and (V, E) the graph defined by these queries (cf. Sect. 4.1). Denote any query history to L i (i = 2, 3) by L. Furthermore, denote byL P ,L Q the set of queries to the right oracles that are observed by the distinguisher 5 , and denote by (Ṽ ,Ẽ) the subgraph defined by these. We focus on the outcomes of the left oracle: we need to prove that given the viewsL P ,L Q , and given query history L, the outcomes of new queries to the left oracle are identically distributed in game 2 and 3. Concretely, for α ∈ Z n 2 , we analyze the probability
. We will show that for both games the following holds: if L i (M ) is evaluatable byL P ,L Q , the query answer can be obtained deterministically from this history. On the other hand, if it is not evaluatable byL P ,L Q , (5) holds with probability 1/2 n only. In other words, this probability is the same in both games i = 2, 3, which proves the claim that the answers by L 2 , L 3 are identically distributed. For the purpose of the proof, we also consider evaluatability by L P , L Q , which is defined similarly as before. Observe that
We now analyze (5). First we consider the case L i (M ) is evaluatable byL P ,L Q . Then we consider the case it is not evaluatable by these views (but it may be evaluatable by L P , L Q ).
(1) L i (M ) (i = 2, 3) is evaluatable byL P ,L Q . In both games, this means that there exists an h k inr(Ṽ ) such that IV M −→ h k , and h k ∈ dom(L P ). By Claim 2 below, there are no colliding paths and in particular the described path M is unique. Furthermore, due to Claim 3 below, h k had been added to dom(L P ) in a forward query, after it was added tor(Ṽ ). Therefore, by line 1c, we have
As a consequence, L 1 (M ), and thus L 2 (M ) and L 3 (M ), is fully determined byL P ,L Q , which means that the outcomes in game 2 and 3 are identically distributed;
In game 3, L P , L Q also includes queries made to the right oracle via the left oracle L 3 . We will show, however, that (5) holds with probability 1/2 n then. Similarly to case (1), there exists an
Concluding, (5) holds with probability 1/2 n in this case; queried in lines 6a and 1c only) . Therefore, in this case L 2 (M ) outputs a value h randomly sampled from Z n 2 . For game 3, let j ≤ k be the maximal index such that IV = h 0
−→ h j is a path in (V, E). We consider the following cases:
is not evaluatable, we have h k ∈ dom(L P ). In line 6h of the oracle query of L 3 (M ), R P (h k ) will then be computed via lines 1b-1e:
As a consequence, the outcomes of L 2 and L 3 are identically distributed in this case; (ii) j < k. Then, there exists a path IV → h j labeled by (M 1 , . . . , M j ), but (V, E) contains no edge h j → h j+1 labeled by M j+1 . By virtue of Claim 2, in the (j + 1) th iteration of lines 6c-6f, a new node h j+1 will be added to r(V ) such that h j+1 was not rooted yet and there is no outgoing edge from h j+1 in the updated graph. The same holds for all subsequent iterations, and in particular h k will be newly added tō r(V ) in the k th iteration. Due to Claim 3, this newly added note is not an element of dom(L P ) after this last round. Now, the same analysis as in (3i) applies.
Claim 2. Suppose D Gi sets ¬bad (for i = 2, 3). Consider a node s ∈ r(V ), and a right oracle query in which an edge (s, t) will be added to (V, E). Denote by (V , E ) the updated graph (after the query). Then, t has no incoming or outgoing edge in (V , E \{(s, t)}). As a consequence, after the execution of G i , the final graph contains no colliding paths.
Proof. In a right query to R P −1 or R Q −1 , none of the newly added edges have a rooted node as starting point, by ¬(bad 3 ∨ bad 4 ) (lines 3f and 4c). Consider a query x 1 to R P , and let (V, E) be the graph before the query. An outgoing edge from s ∈ r(V ) will only be added if s = x 1 ⊕ x 2 for some x 2 ∈ dom(L Q ). By construction, the end node of the edge is x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 =: t. By line 1l and ¬bad 1 , we have (a) t ∈ V , (b) none of the newly added edges will leave from t and (c) apart from (s, t), none of the newly added edges will arrive at t. As a consequence, t is an isolated node in (V , E \{(s, t)}). A similar argument holds for queries to R Q , by line 2e and ¬bad 2 . We prove that the final graph contains no colliding paths by mathematical induction. Before the first query is made, E = ∅ and hence no colliding paths occur. Assume (V, E) contains no colliding paths and consider a right oracle query. We can sequentially apply the above reasoning and discard all newly added edges (s, t) for s ∈ r(V ), in order to observe that colliding paths in (V , E ) imply colliding paths in (V, E). By the induction hypothesis, these do not occur.
Claim 3. Suppose D
Gi sets ¬bad (for i = 2, 3). Consider a right oracle query in which a node t will be added tor(V ). Then, t is no element of (the updated) dom(L P ). Furthermore,r(V )∩dom(L P ) will only be increased in forward queries to R P .
Proof. As a direct consequence of Claim 2,r(V ) will be increased only if an edge
is a path in (V, E), and x 2 ∈ Z(M ). Due to lines 1m and 2f, and by ¬(bad 1 ∨ bad 2 ), this newly added node is not an element of (the updated) dom(L P ). Furthermore, an inverse query to R P will never be answered with a node already inr(V ), by line 3c and ¬bad 3 , and thereforer(V ) ∩ dom(L P ) will only be increased in forward queries to R P .
On query R P (x 1 ):
On query R Q (x 2 ):
On query R P -1 (y 1 ):
On query R Q -1 (y 2 ):
On query L 1 (M ): Fig. 3 . Game 1 (with the boxed statement removed) and game 2 (including the boxed statement). In game 1, the distinguisher has access to L 1 , R L1 . In game 2, the distinguisher has access to L L1 2 , R L1 .
On query L 1 (M ): 
2e if x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 ∈ V ∪ (Vnew \{x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 }) or 2f x 2 ∈ Z(M ) and x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y 2 ∈ dom(L P ) :
2i ret L Q (x 2 ) ← y 2
On query R P -1 (y 1 ): On query R Q -1 (y 2 ): On query R Q (x 2 ):
On query R Q -1 (y 2 ): On query R P (x 1 ):
1b if x 1 ∈r(V ) : On query R P -1 (y 1 ): h i ← a⊕ b⊕ h i−1
where Vnew = {x1 ⊕ x 2 , x1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ y1 ⊕ y 2 | (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ L Q } is a multiset;
where Vnew = {x 1 ⊕ x2, x 1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ y 1 ⊕ y2 | (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ L P } is a multiset;
A3 =r(V ) ∪ {x2 ⊕ s | x2 ∈ dom(L Q ), s ∈ r(V )} ; A4 = {x1 ⊕ s | x1 ∈ dom(L P ), s ∈ r(V )} . 
